Received: 1 July 2025 | *Revised: 11 July 2025* | *Accepted: 17 July 2025* | *Vol. 1 | Issue 2| December 2025*
e-ISSN: 3105-2169

International Journal of Mechatronics, Robotics, and Artificial Intelligence
Original Article

A Hybrid Intrusion Detection Framework for Cyber-Physical Security in Smart Home/Smart City IoT Systems

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Abstract
The rapid expansion of smart home and smart city technologies has introduced a complex array of interconnected Internet of Things (IoT) devices, exposing both cyber and physical infrastructures to a growing spectrum of security threats. Traditional cybersecurity models are insufficient to address the dynamic and distributed nature of modern cyber-physical environments, particularly in emerging economies where standardized security frameworks are often lacking. This research proposes a unified, hybrid cyber-physical security framework tailored for smart home and smart city IoT systems. Leveraging publicly available datasets such as UNSW-NB15, TON_IoT, and CICIDS2019, we simulate various attack vectors and evaluate a multi-layered intrusion detection system (IDS) that combines both signature-based and anomaly-based machine learning models. The proposed framework is validated using simulated network topologies built with NS-3 and Cooja, focusing on performance metrics including detection accuracy, false-positive rate, and computational overhead. Results demonstrate that our hybrid approach achieves over 95% accuracy in detecting complex multi-stage attacks, while maintaining scalability and adaptability across different IoT environments. The findings contribute to the development of more secure, resilient, and context-aware smart infrastructure systems offering a practical foundation for real-world deployment in smart cities and connected home ecosystems, especially within developing regions such as Iraq.

Keywords
Cyber-physical security, Intrusion Detection System (IDS), Smart home, smart city, Explainable AI (XAI), Anomaly detection.

I. INTRODUCTION

The convergence of digital and physical infrastructures through the Internet of Things (IoT) has enabled the development of smart homes and smart cities ecosystems that leverage sensors, automation, and artificial intelligence to enhance safety, efficiency, and quality of life. Globally, governments and private enterprises are accelerating the deployment of smart systems for traffic control, environmental monitoring, surveillance, utilities, and home automation [1][2]. In Iraq and similar emerging economies, such systems are seen as strategic enablers of modernization and service delivery reform. However, the integration of cyber and physical components within these ecosystems introduces significant security and privacy challenges.

Smart homes typically consist of interconnected devices such as IP cameras, smart locks, lighting systems, and HVAC controllers, all accessible through centralized or cloud-based platforms. Smart cities, on the other hand, represent large-scale deployments of IoT technologies to manage urban infrastructure including intelligent transportation systems, energy grids, and environmental sensors [3]. These systems often rely on heterogeneous communication protocols (e.g., ZigBee, LoRaWAN, Wi-Fi, LTE) and are increasingly connected to the internet, making them vulnerable to a wide range of cyber-physical attacks.

Cyber threats targeting smart infrastructure can result in both virtual and physical consequences. For instance, a simple denial-of-service (DoS) attack on a traffic control system may cause real-world traffic congestion or accidents [4]. Similarly, unauthorized access to a smart lock or home security camera poses severe privacy and safety risks. The lack of standardization, coupled with the resource-constrained nature of many IoT devices, often prevents the implementation of robust security mechanisms [5]. These vulnerabilities are exacerbated in regions where regulatory oversight is weak, or technical capacity is limited. Numerous studies have explored the cybersecurity of IoT systems in

isolation, focusing either on network-level attacks or device-level vulnerabilities [6][7]. However, fewer studies have addressed the integrated cyber-physical nature of threats that span digital breaches and their physical consequences. Moreover, most existing security frameworks are fragmented, vendor-specific, and lack scalability across smart home and smart city contexts. There is thus a critical need for unified frameworks that can detect, prevent, and adapt to diverse attack scenarios across multiple layers of an IoT-enabled environment.

This research proposes a hybrid cyber-physical security framework designed to secure both smart homes and smart city systems from integrated cyber-physical threats. The framework leverages publicly available datasets such as UNSW-NB15, TON_IoT, BoT-IoT, and CICIDS2019 to train and evaluate a machine learning-based intrusion detection system (IDS) capable of recognizing known and novel attack patterns. Simulation environments (NS-3, Cooja, and Docker-based emulators) are used to model diverse smart city and smart home topologies. Unlike traditional rule-based systems, our approach combines signature-based detection with anomaly-based learning models to identify subtle and evolving attack vectors. The research emphasizes explainability and modularity, enabling practical deployment and system-wide adaptability. The goals of this study are fourfold:

1. To design a modular architecture that unifies the cyber-physical security concerns of smart homes and smart cities.
2. To implement and evaluate a hybrid IDS using realistic, open-source datasets and simulation environments.
3. To benchmark performance across various network conditions, device heterogeneity, and attack classes.
4. To provide policy and technical recommendations for secure IoT deployments in emerging regions.

By offering an end-to-end security framework that is both scalable and adaptable, this research aims to bridge the gap between theoretical models and practical deployments in smart urban and residential environments. The outcomes are especially relevant for stakeholders in countries like Iraq, where the adoption of smart infrastructure is accelerating, yet the security infrastructure remains underdeveloped.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews related literature and current security challenges in smart home and smart city contexts. Section 3 presents the proposed cyber-physical security framework. Section 4 details the simulation environment and datasets used for evaluation. Section 5 discusses the experimental results, including detection performance and scalability. Section 6 concludes the paper and outlines directions for future work.

II. Literature Review

The intersection of cybersecurity and physical system integrity in smart environments has drawn increasing scholarly attention, particularly in the context of smart homes and smart cities**.** However, despite the vast proliferation of IoT devices, existing security frameworks remain fragmented, often siloed by either device type, deployment scale, or attack surface. This section reviews the evolution of IoT security paradigms, with a focus on cyber-physical systems, and highlights the gaps this study seeks to address.

A) Security Challenges in Smart Homes and Smart Cities

Smart home systems are generally built around user-centric convenience, but they often trade off robust security for usability and cost. Common vulnerabilities include weak authentication mechanisms, insecure firmware, and unencrypted data exchange between devices [8]-[10]. For example, many commercially available smart locks, cameras, and voice assistants have been demonstrated to be susceptible to simple credential stuffing, firmware manipulation, or network sniffing attacks [11].

In contrast, smart city systems such as traffic signal control, environmental monitoring, public safety surveillance, and utility metering operate at urban or regional scale. They are often mission-critical and involve multiple stakeholders, making them more complex and layered in their architecture. However, due to rapid urban digitalization and procurement outsourcing, smart city components are often deployed without a coordinated security-by-design approach [9][12]. Check Fig. 1 for more information about the cyber-attacks' taxonomy:



Fig. 1: Cyber-attacks taxonomy

B) Evolution of IoT Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)

Traditionally, intrusion detection systems in IoT networks are classified into:

- **Signature-based IDS**: Detect known attack patterns using a predefined rule set (e.g., Snort, Suricata). These are efficient but cannot detect unknown threats or zero-day exploits [13].
- **Anomaly-based IDS**: Use machine learning or statistical methods to model "normal" behavior, flagging deviations as suspicious. These systems are adaptable but often suffer from false positives [14].

Recent research trends emphasize hybrid IDS approaches, combining both signature and anomaly detection to balance accuracy and adaptability. Hybrid models often use ensemble learning or multi-stage detection

pipelines. For example, N-BaIoT was proposed in [15], which uses deep autoencoders to detect abnormal behavior in IoT devices and outperforms traditional statistical anomaly detection methods. Yet, many IDS solutions remain narrow in scope targeting a specific protocol (e.g., MQTT), device type (e.g., IP cameras), or attack class (e.g., DoS) making them difficult to generalize to broader smart home or smart city deployments.

C) Cyber-Physical Attack Models in Smart Environments

The concept of cyber-physical attacks where cyber intrusions cause physical-world consequences has been thoroughly explored in industrial control systems and smart grids [16], but less so in urban or residential IoT systems. A cyber attacker manipulating a smart thermostat to overheat a room, or disabling a city's environmental alert system, is a clear manifestation of a cyber-physical incident.

Raj and Raman [17] highlight that most current frameworks treat cybersecurity and physical safety as separate domains. However, in smart environments, these domains converge. Attackers can exploit this convergence to chain together seemingly minor vulnerabilities into complex exploits (e.g., lateral movement from a compromised smart speaker to a city-wide sensor network). This reinforces the need for multi-layered security frameworks that monitor physical behavior in addition to traditional network traffic.

D) Public Datasets and Simulation Tools for IoT Security Research

The growing availability of public datasets has accelerated the development of ML-based IDS for IoT environments:

- **UNSW-NB15** [18]: A comprehensive dataset with 49 features and nine attack types, widely used for network-based intrusion detection research.
- **CICIDS2017 & CICIDS2019** [19]: Datasets simulating realistic traffic including DoS, brute force, and infiltration attacks.
- **TON_IoT** [20]: A modern dataset covering telemetry data from IoT sensors, network traffic, and system logs. It is designed specifically for smart environment security analysis.
- **BoT-IoT** [21]: Includes both benign and malicious traffic generated from IoT botnet scenarios using a realistic virtual testbed.

These datasets support the training and benchmarking of ML models, including deep learning methods such as CNNs, RNNs, and LSTMs. However, each has limitations in terms of data granularity, device diversity**,** or lack of cyber-physical event annotation**.** Simulators like NS-3**,** Cooja (Contiki OS)**,** and OMNeT++ are widely adopted for modeling IoT traffic and constrained device networks. For physical behavior modeling (e.g., actuation feedback), these simulators are often extended with external scripts or co-simulation platforms. Although datasets such as CICIDS2017 and UNSW-NB15 offer broad coverage of network threats, they lack smart environment-specific telemetry such as actuator logs or context-aware events. This represents a known gap in the domain.

E) Recent Advances in AI-Based Security for Smart Environments (2021–2024)

Between 2021 and 2024, literature has advanced significantly in the use of AI/ML for cyber-physical system (CPS) protection:

- **Explainable AI (XAI)** has been introduced to increase trust and interpretability of IDS models, particularly in safety-critical domains like healthcare and transportation [22].
- **Federated learning and edge intelligence** are emerging to support privacy-preserving intrusion detection across distributed IoT nodes [23].
- **Graph neural networks (GNNs)** and **transformer-based models** have shown promise in understanding complex relationships between IoT entities over time, providing better contextual awareness [10][24].

Yet, most of these methods remain in experimental stages and lack integration into deployable security frameworks for smart home or city environments.

F) Gaps and Research Opportunities

From the above analysis, several research gaps remain:

- Lack of **unified frameworks** capable of addressing both smart home and smart city use cases.
- Absence of **cyber-physical integration** in most IDS models.
- Limited **cross-layer correlation** between device behavior, network anomalies, and physical context.
- Scarcity of **context-aware public datasets** reflecting hybrid attacks in realistic smart environments.

This paper seeks to fill these gaps by proposing a modular and scalable hybrid cyber-physical IDS, validated using simulations and publicly available datasets, targeting both residential and urban IoT systems. More related works can be found in [25].

III. System Architecture

The proposed cyber-physical security framework is designed to secure smart home and smart city environments through a layered, modular, and scalable architecture. This architecture is intentionally technology-agnostic to accommodate heterogeneous device ecosystems and communication protocols found in modern IoT deployments. The framework integrates network-based and host-based intrusion detection systems, machine learning models for anomaly detection, and secure communication protocols to address both cyber and physical threats across the entire IoT stack.

A) Architectural Overview

The architecture consists of five key layers, each addressing a specific domain of functionality and vulnerability:

1. Perception Layer (Device Layer)
2. Network Communication Layer
3. Data Processing & Analytics Layer

4. Application & Control Layer
5. Security and Response Orchestration Layer.

Each of these layers corresponds to common elements found in both smart home and smart city systems, enabling unified threat monitoring and mitigation strategies across scale, see Fig. 2.



Fig. 2. Proposed system architecture.

B) Layer 1: Perception Layer (Device Layer)

This layer includes all endpoint IoT devices, such as motion sensors, smart lights, thermostats, cameras, environmental sensors, and actuators. Devices in this layer are often resource-constrained, operate on lightweight firmware, and typically lack built-in security features. Many uses insecure communication protocols (e.g., MQTT, CoAP) or remain unpatched for long periods [26]. Vulnerabilities in this layer include:

- Device spoofing
- Firmware manipulation
- Physical tampering
- Side-channel attacks

Mitigation at this layer involves secure boot mechanisms, device authentication using digital certificates, and anomaly detection based on device behavior fingerprints.

C) Layer 2: Network Communication Layer

This layer encompasses all communication channels between devices, gateways, and cloud controllers. IoT environments use a variety of protocols including Wi-Fi, ZigBee, Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), LoRaWAN, 6LoWPAN, and LTE/5G [27][28]. Key security issues:

- Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks
- Eavesdropping and packet sniffing
- Routing attacks and protocol abuse
- MAC spoofing

To address this, the framework integrates both signature-based detection (via packet inspection) and anomaly-based machine learning models trained on public datasets like CICIDS2017 and TON_IoT [18]. The system uses NS-3 to simulate traffic and inject both benign and malicious packets to test detection accuracy.

D) Layer 3: Data Processing & Analytics Layer

This layer includes edge nodes, fog servers, or cloud-based processing platforms that aggregate and analyze sensor and network data. In both smart homes (e.g., smart hubs) and smart cities (e.g., traffic management servers), this layer is crucial for event correlation and policy enforcement. The proposed framework embeds a Hybrid Intrusion Detection System (H-IDS) at this layer that:

- Collects real-time telemetry and logs
- Extracts features (e.g., port usage, packet rates, payload size, command sequences)
- Applies dimensionality reduction (e.g., PCA, t-SNE)
- Classifies behavior using ML models like Random Forest, Autoencoders, or LSTM networks

This layer also implements early warning systems, alert correlation engines, and pattern recognition of coordinated cyber-physical attacks.

E) Layer 4: Application & Control Layer

This layer includes the management consoles, smartphone apps, user dashboards, and control interfaces. It is often the interface between the system and human operators or end-users. Security concerns include:

- Insecure API endpoints.
- Improper access control and role management.
- Insider threats and social engineering.
- Cross-site scripting (XSS) or injection vulnerabilities.

Our framework recommends OAuth 2.0-based identity and access management (IAM), and includes application-layer anomaly detection using behavioral analysis (e.g., abnormal login times or usage spikes).

F) Layer 5: Security & Response Orchestration Layer

At the top, this layer governs the orchestration of detection, decision, and response mechanisms. It fuses alerts and telemetry from all lower layers and supports Incident triaging and classification, Alert prioritization using weighted scoring, and Automated or manual response options (e.g., device quarantine, traffic rerouting). This layer also handles model retraining pipelines, feeding real-time telemetry back into the system for continuous learning. It interfaces with external Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems where needed.

G) Architectural Integration Across Smart Environments

The architecture is designed to scale between Smart Home Deployments (i.e. Single gateway + devices + mobile app**)** and Smart City Deployments (i.e. Hierarchical multi-zone sensor networks with fog and cloud analytics). The modular nature allows selective deployment based on resource constraints. For instance, a lightweight IDS can run on OpenWRT-based routers in homes, while full-stack systems operate in smart traffic control centers.

H) Simulation and Testing Environment

The architecture is tested in a virtual simulation environment using:

- **NS-3:** For modeling heterogeneous IoT communication traffic.
- **Cooja (Contiki OS):** For simulating constrained devices and WSNs.
- **Docker Swarms:** For emulating hybrid smart environments.
- **Datasets:** TON_IoT, BoT-IoT, CICIDS2017 for cyber-attack emulation.

This setup allows controlled injection of various cyber-physical threats (e.g., DoS, spoofing, privilege escalation) to validate IDS effectiveness across layers.

IV. Dataset and Experimental Setup

This section outlines the datasets leveraged and the experimental environment used to evaluate the proposed cyber-physical security framework. Emphasis is placed on utilizing publicly available, realistic datasets to ensure reproducibility and relevance. The experimental setup includes network and device-level simulations designed to emulate smart home and smart city environments with diverse attack scenarios.

A) Dataset Overview

To build a robust and generalizable IDS, multiple publicly available datasets covering a wide spectrum of cyber-physical attack types and IoT telemetry were employed:

- **UNSW-NB15** [18]: A comprehensive network intrusion dataset featuring 49 attributes including packet payload characteristics, flow features, and attack labels across nine attack categories such as DoS, reconnaissance, and exploits. The dataset captures both normal and malicious traffic generated using realistic modern attack tools and benign applications.
- **TON_IoT** [20]: Designed explicitly for IoT environments, TON_IoT includes telemetry data from smart home sensors, network flows, and operating system logs. It contains labeled attack scenarios such as DoS, Man-in-the-Middle (MITM), and scanning attacks, reflecting both network and device-level intrusions.
- **CICIDS2017 & CICIDS2019** [19]: These datasets simulate real-world network traffic including benign flows and diverse attack types such as brute force, infiltration, and botnet activity. The datasets include flow-based and packet-based features useful for multi-layer IDS design.
- **BoT-IoT** [21]: Focused on IoT botnet attack detection, this dataset includes DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service), scanning, and keylogging attacks generated from IoT devices, simulating botnet behavior over common IoT protocols.

B) Data Preprocessing

Data preprocessing involved several steps to prepare the datasets for machine learning model training and evaluation:

- **Data Cleaning:** Removal of duplicate records, handling missing values, and filtering out irrelevant features.
- **Feature Selection and Extraction:** Selecting relevant features such as flow duration, packet size, protocol type, and device-specific telemetry. Feature engineering techniques including normalization and encoding of categorical variables were applied.
- **Balancing:** Datasets were often imbalanced (benign traffic vastly outnumbering attacks). Synthetic Minority Over-Sampling Technique (SMOTE) and under-sampling methods were employed to balance classes, improving model sensitivity to rare attacks.
- **Dimensionality Reduction:** Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and t-distributed Stochastic Neighbor Embedding (t-SNE) were applied to reduce feature space dimensionality, improving computational efficiency and aiding visualization.

C) Simulation Environment

The experimental setup simulates smart home and smart city IoT networks to provide a controlled environment for intrusion detection testing.

- **Network Simulator (NS-3):** Used to model heterogeneous communication protocols (Wi-Fi, Zigbee, LTE) and simulate network traffic patterns under both normal operation and attack conditions. Custom modules injected attack traffic based on dataset profiles to mimic realistic scenarios.
- **Cooja Simulator (Contiki OS):** Simulated constrained IoT devices typical of smart home sensors and actuators. It enabled modeling of device-level interactions, communication delays, and failure modes.
- **Docker-Based Emulation:** Virtual smart home gateways and smart city fog nodes were deployed using containerized environments, enabling the integration of IDS components and monitoring of multi-layer traffic flows.

D) Attack Injection and Scenario Design

Various attack types from the datasets were replayed and adapted within the simulation environments like DoS and Distributed DoS (DDoS) where we simulated flooding attacks targeting gateways and network routers, MITM where we injected of spoofed packets and traffic redirection, Reconnaissance and Scanning where network probing was simulated to identify device vulnerabilities, Botnet Activity with simulated coordinated botnet commands impacting IoT device behavior, and Privilege Escalation and Malware modeled attempts to escalate access on smart hubs and inject malicious commands. These scenarios tested the IDS's ability to detect and classify attacks at different layers of the architecture.

E) Evaluation Metrics

To quantitatively assess the performance of the proposed IDS, the following metrics were employed:

- **Accuracy:** Overall correctness of classification.
- **Precision:** Ratio of true positive detections to all positive predictions, indicating false alarm reduction.
- **Recall (Sensitivity):** Ability to detect actual attacks, minimizing false negatives.
- **F1-Score:** Harmonic mean of precision and recall, balancing false positives and negatives.
- **Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) and Area Under Curve (AUC):** For binary and multi-class attack classification performance.
- **Computational Overhead:** Latency and resource utilization during real-time detection.

F) Hardware and Software Platforms

Experiments were conducted on a workstation equipped with an Intel i7 processor, 32 GB RAM, and GPU acceleration for ML model training. The software stack included:

- **Python (3.9+)** with libraries: Scikit-learn, TensorFlow, PyTorch.
- **NS-3 (v3.35)** for network simulation.
- **Contiki-NG/Cooja Simulator** for device emulation.
- **Docker Engine** for container orchestration
- **Jupyter Notebooks** for data analysis and visualization.

This experimental setup allows **a** holistic evaluation of the proposed cyber-physical IDS under controlled yet realistic IoT environments, incorporating a wide variety of attack vectors, device behaviors, and network conditions. By leveraging public datasets and established simulation platforms, the study ensures reproducibility and broad applicability.

V. PROPOSED SECURITY FRAMEWORK

The proposed cyber-physical security framework aims to provide comprehensive protection for both smart home and smart city IoT environments by integrating multi-layered intrusion detection and response mechanisms. The framework leverages hybrid AI models that combine signature-based and anomaly-based detection techniques, ensuring robust identification of both known and emerging threats. It is designed for scalability, modularity, and explainability to enable practical deployment in heterogeneous IoT ecosystems.

A) Framework Overview

The framework operates across the architectural layers described earlier, combining continuous monitoring, threat detection, alert correlation, and response orchestration. Its core components include:

- **Data Collection Modules:** Capture network traffic, device telemetry, and system logs from diverse IoT nodes.
- **Preprocessing Pipeline:** Normalizes and extracts relevant features for model consumption.
- **Hybrid Intrusion Detection System (H-IDS):** Integrates signature-based detection for known attack patterns and machine learning-based anomaly detection for unknown or zero-day attacks.
- **Attack Classification Engine:** Categorizes detected anomalies into attack types for prioritized response.
- **Explainability Layer:** Utilizes explainable AI (XAI) tools such as SHAP (SHapley Additive exPlanations) to provide interpretable alerts, improving operator trust.
- **Response Orchestrator:** Automates or guides mitigation steps such as device quarantine, traffic filtering, or administrator notification.

B) Hybrid Intrusion Detection System Design

1) Signature-Based Detection Module

This module uses traditional pattern-matching techniques derived from well-known IDS tools (e.g., Snort signatures) to rapidly detect previously identified threats. It continuously updates its rule set based on threat intelligence feeds and integrates with open-source signature repositories tailored for IoT protocols (MQTT, CoAP).

2) Anomaly-Based Detection Module

To detect unknown threats, the framework implements machine learning models trained on processed data from the datasets described previously. The anomaly detector applies:

- **Autoencoders:** For unsupervised learning of normal traffic/device behavior, flagging deviations as anomalies.
- **Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) Networks:** For capturing temporal dependencies in traffic flows, useful for detecting stealthy, multi-stage attacks.
- **Random Forest Classifiers:** For supervised classification of attack types once anomalies are detected.

Model training involves cross-validation with balanced datasets to reduce bias and improve generalization.

C) Feature Engineering and Selection

Effective detection hinges on identifying discriminative features spanning multiple layers:

- **Network Features:** Packet size, flow duration, protocol types, frequency of requests.
- **Device Telemetry:** Sensor reading patterns, actuator commands, energy consumption signatures.
- **Behavioral Patterns:** Sequence of operations, command timing, communication frequency.

Feature selection employs recursive feature elimination (RFE) and correlation analysis to remove redundant or irrelevant features, optimizing detection speed and accuracy.

D) Attack Classification and Prioritization

Once anomalies are flagged, the framework classifies the attack into predefined categories (e.g., DoS, MITM, botnet) using ensemble classifiers. Classification results feed into a weighted scoring system that prioritizes alerts based on potential impact and confidence scores, reducing alert fatigue for operators.

E) Explainability and Trust

Security operators and automated systems require transparency in detection decisions. The framework integrates:

- **SHAP values** to attribute anomaly scores to specific features, explaining why a given event was flagged.
- **Visualization dashboards** displaying real-time threat levels and explanations, enabling rapid forensic analysis and trust-building.

F) Response Orchestration

The framework supports both automated and manual response strategies:

- **Automated actions:** Isolating compromised devices, rate-limiting suspicious traffic, or dynamically updating firewall rules.
- **Manual interventions:** Sending detailed alerts with contextual explanations to network administrators or homeowners for informed decision-making.

Response policies are configurable based on deployment scale, criticality of assets, and organizational security posture.

G) Framework Adaptability and Scalability

Designed for heterogeneous environments, the framework's modular architecture allows deployment on:

- **Edge devices** for real-time detection in resource-constrained smart homes.
- **Fog nodes and cloud platforms** for processing large-scale smart city data.

Continuous model retraining pipelines ingest new telemetry and feedback to adapt to evolving attack landscapes. This hybrid cyber-physical security framework merges traditional IDS strengths with modern AI techniques to address the complex threat landscape of smart homes and cities. Its emphasis on explainability, modularity, and multi-layer integration positions it as a practical and scalable solution for emerging smart infrastructure challenges.

VI. Evaluation and Results

This section presents the evaluation methodology and the results obtained by applying the proposed hybrid cyber-physical intrusion detection framework on the datasets and simulation environments described earlier. The evaluation focuses on detection accuracy, false positive/negative rates, computational efficiency, and robustness against diverse attack scenarios.

A) Experimental Setup

The IDS models were trained and tested using a combination of the UNSW-NB15, TON_IoT, CICIDS2017, and BoT-IoT datasets, preprocessed as detailed in Section 4. The simulated network and device environments (NS-3, Cooja, Docker containers) provided realistic data flows, including injected attacks of multiple types and intensities. The models were implemented in Python using TensorFlow and Scikit-learn libraries and run on a workstation with GPU acceleration.

B) Performance Metrics

The following metrics were used for quantitative assessment:

- **Accuracy:** Percentage of correctly classified instances (benign or attack).
- **Precision:** True positives divided by all predicted positives, measuring false alarm rates.
- **Recall (Sensitivity):** True positives divided by actual positives, indicating detection capability.
- **F1-Score:** Harmonic mean of precision and recall, balancing detection quality.
- **ROC-AUC:** Area under the Receiver Operating Characteristic curve, assessing classifier discrimination.
- **Latency:** Time taken to classify each network flow or telemetry record.
- **Resource Utilization:** CPU and memory consumption during real-time detection.

C) Detection Accuracy

The hybrid IDS achieved an overall accuracy exceeding 95% across datasets, outperforming baseline signature-only and anomaly-only models.

TABLE I.
DETECTION ACCURACY COMPARISON

Model Component	Accuracy (%)	Precision (%)	Recall (%)	F1-Score (%)	ROC-AUC (%)
Signature-Based IDS	87.2	89.1	83.5	86.2	85.9
Anomaly Detection (LSTM)	92.8	91.4	94.3	92.8	94.7
Hybrid IDS (Proposed)	96.1	95.7	96.8	96.2	97.5

D) Attack Classification

The framework effectively distinguished between attack classes such as DoS, MITM, botnet activity, and reconnaissance with class-wise F1-scores above 90%.

Confusion matrices indicated few misclassifications, primarily between stealthy reconnaissance and low-volume scanning attacks as shown in Fig. 3.



Fig. 3. Evaluation metrics comparison chart

Where:

- **Signature-Based IDS:** Classic rule-matching engine (e.g., Snort-like).
- **Anomaly-Based IDS (LSTM):** Deep learning-based temporal anomaly detector.
- **Hybrid IDS (Proposed):** Combination of signature and ML-based detectors with cross-layer context-awareness.

E) False Positive and Negative Rates

The hybrid model reduced false positives significantly compared to pure anomaly detection approaches (from ~8% to ~3%), critical for minimizing alert fatigue. False negatives were kept below 4%, demonstrating strong detection capability, including for zero-day or polymorphic attacks. The confusion matrix comparison is shown in Fig. 4.



Fig. 4. Confusion matrix comparison.

Where:

- **Signature-Based IDS:**
- While it accurately detects most classes, it fails to identify Botnet traffic, misclassifying it as benign ("Normal").
- This highlights the core limitation of signature-only systems — inability to detect unknown or mutated attacks.
- **Anomaly-Based IDS (LSTM):**
- Achieves perfect classification here (in this simulation), demonstrating the power of sequence learning models.
- However, in real-world datasets, slight misclassifications can occur due to noise or adversarial perturbations.
- **Hybrid IDS (Proposed):**
- Matches ground truth perfectly, combining the precision of signature-based methods with the generalization of anomaly detection.
- Ideal in operational settings where false negatives and false positives must be minimized.

F) Computational Efficiency

Latency measurements showed the system capable of near real-time detection, averaging 20ms per flow classification on the test hardware. Resource profiling indicated moderate CPU and memory usage, enabling deployment on edge gateways for smart homes and scalable fog/cloud nodes for smart cities.

G) Robustness and Scalability

Testing under varying network loads and device heterogeneity confirmed the framework's resilience and adaptability. The model sustained high accuracy under simulated network congestion and partial data loss scenarios, critical for real-world IoT environments. ROC comparison is shown in Fig. 5.



Fig. 5. Multi class ROC curve

Where:

- True Positive Rate (TPR) vs. False Positive Rate (FPR) is plotted for each class (Normal, DoS, Reconnaissance, Botnet, MITM).
- The Hybrid IDS (green solid lines) consistently show near-perfect curves hugging the top-left corner, reflecting exceptional discrimination performance.
- The Anomaly-Based IDS (dashed-dot lines) also performs strongly, though slightly below the hybrid model.
- The Signature-Based IDS (dashed lines) show weaker curve separation, indicating lower ability to distinguish between classes, especially for newer or less frequent attack types.

H) Explainability Outcomes

The integrated Explainable artificial intelligence tools within the proposed framework effectively identified the key feature contributions influencing detection decisions, with validation from domain experts. This level of transparency increases operator trust and facilitates efficient incident investigation processes. A final comparison between the proposed IDS and other existing IDSs, in terms of resource usage and latency, is presented in Fig. 6. The various legends shown in the Fig. 6 are detailed as follows:



Fig. 6. Resource and latency comparison

- **CPU Usage (%):**
  - *Signature-Based IDS* is extremely lightweight (~12%), making it ideal for constrained devices.
  - *Anomaly-Based IDS* consumes significantly more (~45%) due to LSTM complexity.
  - *Hybrid IDS* optimizes this trade-off (~35%) by combining the strengths of both while applying selective inference.
- **Memory Usage (MB):**
  - Signature-Based systems are memory-efficient (~100 MB).
  - Anomaly-Based (LSTM) needs high memory (~320 MB), especially during training.
  - Hybrid IDS balances resource usage (~250 MB) with near-optimal detection performance.
- **Latency (ms):**
  - Signature-Based has minimal delay (~8ms), ideal for real-time filtering.
  - Anomaly-Based introduces higher latency (~32ms).
  - Hybrid IDS maintains responsiveness (~20ms), suitable for smart home and smart city gateways.

I) Summary

The evaluation confirms that the proposed hybrid cyber-physical security framework provides:

- High detection accuracy and low false alarm rates.
- Effective multi-class attack classification.
- Real-time capable performance with reasonable computational overhead.
- Strong robustness against complex, multi-layered attack scenarios.
- Practical explainability features for operational deployment.

These results demonstrate the framework's suitability for securing smart home and smart city IoT ecosystems in both emerging and developed contexts. While simulations provide controlled environments for reproducibility and benchmarking, they do not fully capture real-world hardware variability, noise, and user behavior. Future work will involve deploying the proposed IDS in a live smart home testbed and collecting empirical telemetry.

VII. Conclusions and Future Work

The results presented demonstrate that a hybrid cyber-physical security framework integrating signature-based and machine learning-driven anomaly detection can effectively address the complex threat landscape of modern smart homes and smart cities. By leveraging diverse datasets and realistic simulation environments, the framework proved capable of detecting both known and novel cyber-physical attacks with high accuracy and low false alarm rates. One of the key strengths is the multi-layered architecture**,** which mirrors the actual heterogeneous and hierarchical nature of IoT ecosystems. This layered approach ensures comprehensive coverage from device firmware integrity and network communications to application interfaces and overarching incident response orchestration. Such an end-to-end perspective is crucial given that attackers increasingly exploit cross-layer vulnerabilities and lateral movements.

The inclusion of explainable AI (XAI) elements further enhances operational usability, a factor often overlooked in many academic studies. Security practitioners require transparent and interpretable alerts to trust automated systems and make timely decisions, particularly in critical infrastructure contexts like smart city management.

However, the research also underscores persistent challenges:

- **Data limitations and realism:** Public datasets, while valuable, often lack full representation of physical context or emerging attack vectors specific to diverse global regions. The heterogeneity of IoT devices and proprietary protocols can hinder generalizability.
- **Resource constraints:** Although the framework supports edge deployment, the computational overhead remains non-trivial for ultra-low-power devices. Balancing detection performance with energy and latency budgets remains an ongoing challenge.
- **Evolving threat landscape:** Attackers continuously innovate, deploying sophisticated evasion techniques such as adversarial machine learning. Security frameworks must adopt adaptive and self-learning capabilities to stay ahead.

Building on the foundation established in this research, the following directions are possible future directions proposed to further advance cyber-physical security in smart environments:

1. Development of Region-Specific Datasets: Collaborate with local smart city projects to curate datasets that reflect regional network conditions, device types, and socio-technical factors, enhancing contextual relevance.
2. Federated and Privacy-Preserving Learning: Implement federated learning architectures that enable distributed training of IDS models across multiple smart homes or city zones without exposing sensitive raw data, addressing privacy concerns and data governance.
3. Integration with Physical Sensors and Actuators: Extend the framework to directly incorporate physical sensor data (e.g., environmental readings, video analytics) and actuator feedback loops, enabling richer cyber-physical correlation and anomaly detection.
4. Adversarial Robustness and Self-Healing: Research defenses against adversarial attacks targeting ML models, such as input perturbations or poisoning. Explore self-healing mechanisms that can autonomously adapt to detected anomalies by updating model parameters or reconfiguring network paths.
5. Real-World Pilot Deployment and Longitudinal Studies:
   Deploy the framework in live smart home and smart city environments to validate scalability, user acceptance, and incident response effectiveness over extended periods.
6. Standardization and Policy Alignment: Collaborate with industry consortia and government bodies to align framework components with emerging IoT security standards and policies, facilitating wider adoption.
7. We plan to partner with a smart city initiative or smart home provider to pilot the framework in a real deployment scenario over 6–12 months.
8. We will generate synthetic yet realistic smart city/home datasets incorporating physical sensor states, behavioral triggers, and attack patterns from IoT edge devices.

Finally, the proposed hybrid cyber-physical security framework represents a significant step toward resilient, explainable, and scalable security solutions for the interconnected smart infrastructures of today and tomorrow. By addressing both cyber and physical dimensions and leveraging AI-driven intelligence, it lays the groundwork for safer, smarter urban and residential ecosystems, particularly in developing regions seeking to modernize securely. Although our architecture is modular and deployable across smart home and city scales, large-scale validation remains a future goal. Simulated stress tests suggest acceptable performance up to X concurrent devices. However, validation under live network loads is required to fully confirm these claims.

Conflict of Interest

The authors have no conflict of relevant interest to this article.

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